A system which provides secured access to a facility or another system to enter or control it can be called as an access control system. It can also act as an attendance providing system that can play a dual role. According to user credentials and possessions access control system is classified, what a user uses for access makes the system different, user can provide different types like pin credentials, biometrics, or smart card.
The system can even use all possessions from the user for multiple access controls involved. Some of the attendance and access control systems are:. The electronic security system extends its applications in various fields like home automation, Residential homes and apartments , commercial offices, banks lockers , industrial, medical, and transportations.
Some of the applications using the electronic security systems are electronic security systems for railway compartments, the electronic eye with security, electronic voting systems are the most commonly used electronic security system.
From the block diagram, the system is mainly designed based on an Electronic eye LDR sensor ; we use this kind of system in bank lockers, jewelry shops. If anyone tries to open the locker door then automatically a light falls on the LDR sensor then the resistance decreases slowly this cause buzzer to alert the customer.
This process continues until the box is closed. If you have any doubts regarding this article and lets you people can also suggest adding more information related to this topic or on the electrical and electronic projects Just leave a comment below. Found your post interesting to read. I cant wait to see your post soon. Good Luck for the upcoming update. This article is really very interesting and effective. Those devices are essential to find out about security framework.
The utilisation of this undertaking is extremely valuable to open. A debt of gratitude is in order for sharing this. Thanks for this interesting information. The electronic security systems is very useful in this modern days. Those tools are very important to to know more about security system. Importance and Classification of Electronic Security System. Share This Post: Facebook. Thank for information, I am extremely impressed you write style. Thank you very much for this valuable contribution and informative.
The model excludes incidents resulting from suicide or attempted suicide these are assumed to be covered under HP Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour. The cluster comprises HP Passenger protruding beyond train gauge. The cluster comprises HP Unsecured objects falling from height. The cluster comprises HP inappropriate separation between passenger and moving vehicle non-rail.
Core Hazard: HP Handling Heavy Loads The hazard is defined to assume some error had occurred in handling a heavy load since otherwise the estimated number of incidents would be so high to be meaningless as a hazard. The cluster comprises HP Error in handling heavy load. Core Hazard: HP Incompatibility of Train and Structure Gauge The HP incompatibility of train and structure gauge have been developed to include those situations where the clearances between trains and infrastructure have been compromised.
The cluster comprises HP incompatibility of train and structure gauge. Core Hazard: HP Abnormal Deceleration The risk model for HP Abnormal deceleration has been developed to strictly model only those instances of a train s slowing sharply when not actually as a part of a derailment or collision scenario. The consequences of the abnormal deceleration part of derailment and collision scenarios are assumed to be included in the loss estimation for those events.
Core Hazard: HP Uncontrolled Approach to Buffer In the causal model, malicious or reckless behaviour on the part of the driver of the relevant train has been assumed to have been included in the data for Driver error. The consequences of this hazard have been taken forward only to the point of the accident s occurring, that beyond is assumed to be calculated by loss modelling.
Therefore, the incidence of fire due to buffer-stop collision has not been separately developed in the consequence model. The consequences have been assumed to fall into three bands collisions at speeds at or below that for which the buffers have been designed collisions at speeds greater than that for which the buffers have been designed and collisions with siding buffer-stops.
The consequence model has been populated using expert judgement. The losses associated with this model include those occurring before the derailment due to abnormal deceleration, if there are any. However, where such deceleration avoids a derailment, the consequences are included in the Abnormal Deceleration model. There may be many instances of animals entering and leaving the railway having no effect at all and being entirely unnoticed.
These scenarios are not modelled, neither are those in which other objects, such as litter, come to rest on the railway, but do not affect the system at all. Instances of objects and animals on the line causing fires are captured in the fire models and not within this model. This model also specifically excludes all causes and consequences arising from the Core Hazard HN Crossing running railway at a Level Crossing.
Core Hazard: HP Inappropriate Separation between Trains The risk model for HP Inappropriate separation between trains has been developed to address only the scenarios in which the separation between trains, normally provided by the signalling system, has broken down. This hazard is defined such that there is no interface between it and the Loss of Balance core hazards.
Noxious fumes are included when the cause is fire related. This core hazard shall not include instability of trains or the movement of materials on trains. Consideration has been given to the interface of this core hazard with the core hazards object on line and inappropriate separation between trains.
All structures going beyond the railway boundary are covered here and not in HP , inappropriate separation between running rail and passenger. Neither the causal nor the consequence models refer to situations where structures are unstable creating a threat to workers.
Workers Group The national level safety study of the railway workers group was planned and conducted over a number of workshops with diverse participants from many of the stakeholder groups.
This comprised planning, operating, station duties, maintenance and driving of trains. By the end of the national level workshops, hazards had been identified [ ] for the workers group. For the passenger group, each core hazard was tagged with a H for hazard, W for workers and a unique number that represents the relative proximity of the hazard to an accident scenario. The core hazards for the workers group, relating to the exposure scenarios are depicted as follows.
Core Hazard: HW Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour The model developed for HW addresses the range of abnormal and criminal behaviours that are known to be performed within the railway infrastructure. They do not, however, address abnormal working practices of railway personnel, with the exception of train drivers and senior conductors. This was agreed with the experts at the start of the modelling process.
The cluster comprises HW Loss of passenger compartment integrity during movement. Core Hazard: HW Loss of Balance We have excluded from this core hazard any falls occurring on level crossings, although works crossings were included. There is some overlap at the consequence side with HW. We have included falls getting on and off trains by drivers and cleaning staff who often have to negotiate steps and gaps which would not be encountered by passengers. Core Hazard: HW Inappropriate Separation between Running Railways and Workers The HW Core Hazard for inappropriate separation between running rail and workers has been developed to include those situations where the distance between the running rail and people is not sufficient to ensure the safety of workers.
This model also does not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and workers resulting from suicides. Core Hazard: HW Worker Protruding Beyond Train Gauge During Movement Core Hazard HW , worker protruding beyond train gauge during movement, have been developed to include all situations in which a person is protruding outside the gauge of a moving train.
The model developed excludes incidents resulting from suicide or attempted suicide these are assumed to be covered under HHW abnormal or criminal behaviour. The cluster comprises HW Unsecured objects at height. The cluster comprises HW inappropriate separation between workers and vehicles. Core Hazard: HW Handling Heavy Loads The core hazard was defined to assume some error had occurred in handling a heavy load since otherwise the estimated number of incidents could be so high to be meaningless as a hazard.
We scoped the hazard to cover manual handling of loads, including unloading from vehicles. We did not formulate a definition of a heavy load as a specific weight but considered any incident where the handling of a load caused some loss and where the weight of the load was a factor.
We followed the general approach of HP of dividing the hazard into problems with lifting, carrying or stacking a load. Core Hazard: HW Work in Confined Spaces We kept the scope of this hazard quite large to include events where workers are in spaces such as offices and drivers in cabs and are exposed to hazards such as fumes from batteries. There is probably some overlap with core hazard area HW in the consequences relating to workers in a confined space being affected by toxic or hazardous fumes.
We have excluded shunting incidents since these are being dealt with under Core Hazard area HW. The cluster comprises HW Work taking place in confined space. This allows the consideration of detection, mitigation and remediation barriers in the consequence domain.
The release of toxic gases likely to cause harm to workers or neighbours has also been considered under this core hazard. This core hazard considers harm to workers or neighbours as a result of coming into contact with land, water or air contaminated with harmful substances, rather than coming into contact with the harmful substances themselves although the toxicology is similar, the frequency and dispersion will differ.
Core Hazard HW , workers in proximity to harmful substances covers the case where water or land contamination is not an issue. The cluster comprises HW Release of hazardous substances. Any particular scenario where an inappropriate working method was applied to result in an incident which was also covered by another core hazard was excluded. For example, if an inappropriate lifting technique was applied to a task involving a heavy object, we did not consider this part of this core hazard but dealt with it under HW.
This includes those harmful substances carried by the railway dangerous goods as well as harmful substances routinely used in the running and maintenance of the railway fuel oils, caustics, etc.
It does not include substances which are harmful only due to their physical state, for example boiling water or hot food, or indeed, railway food in general. The cluster comprises HW Workers in proximity to harmful substances. The impact on neighbours of objects thrown or falling from trains is included in the work scope for HN and is not included in the scope of work reported here. Neighbours group The national level safety study of the railway neighbours group was planned and conducted over a number of workshops with diverse participants from many of the stakeholder groups.
Neighbours are those who live within proximity of the railway environment and cross the line at level crossings. A similar set of prompts and photos focused on this group were taken and composed into A Day in the Life of a Railway Neighbour that covered most credible scenarios that neighbours of the railways get exposed to generally involuntarily.
The pictorial scenarios were employed as the backdrop to a creative Hazop style process to identify all circumstances where railway neighbours were potentially exposed to hazardous states. In a similar manner, Core Hazards were developed for the neighbour group each Core Hazard was tagged with a H for Hazard, N for Neighbour and a unique number that represents the relative proximity of the hazard to an accident scenario.
The core hazards for the neighbour group, relating to the exposure scenarios are depicted as follows. This was agreed between Human Engineering and Railtrack at the start of the modelling process.
The definition excludes situations in which harm may arise when using a level crossing as intended, for example if a user falls and injures themselves on a crossing but is still able to cross within the design time limit.
Such occurrences are assumed to be subsumed within Core Hazard HN , loss of balance. The model excludes incidents at level crossings resulting from suicide or attempted suicide these are assumed to be covered under HN abnormal or criminal behaviour The model is limited to neighbour hazards and thus does not consider hazards at worker crossings provided within stations, depots, sidings etc.
It should be noted that HN , inappropriate separation between running railway and neighbourhood, did not consider level crossing hazards. HN and HN are thus taken to be mutually exclusive. The cluster comprises HN crossing running railway at a manual level crossing HN crossing running railway at an automatic level crossing HN crossing running railway at user worked level crossing HN crossing running railway at a level crossing.
This core hazard does not include EMI caused by infrastructure or rolling stock to signalling and track circuits, or interference between the rolling stock and infrastructure. Such interference could be considered part of the base event frequencies for other core hazards. Interference caused by radio systems is not explicitly examined, it is considered to be subsumed into the frequencies of the initiating events identified and would be subject to the same design controls and regulations.
In addition, this core hazard does not consider the effects of earth leakage currents causing corrosion of steel pipelines or structures. Thus issues such as HN corrosion of structures from dc rail systems are covered under HN. That core hazard also covers the possibility of electrocution due to inductive pickup in cables running adjacent to the AC electrified lines.
Core Hazard: HN Loss of Balance We have excluded from this core hazard falls to trespassers and falls occurring on level crossings. As all persons on stations are regarded as passengers for the purpose of this project, the relevant neighbours for this core hazard are basically those persons using footpaths and footbridges which form part of the railway infrastructure.
Footpaths alongside public roads are part of the public highway and are excluded. Core Hazard: HN Inappropriate Separation between Running Railway and Neighbourhood The HN Core Hazard for inappropriate separation between running rail and neighbours have been developed to include those situations where the distance between the running rail and people is not sufficient to ensure the safety of passengers, workers or neighbourhood.
This model also does not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and neighbourhood resulting from suicide. Finally, this model does not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and people caused by Derailment. Core Hazard: HN Flying Debris from Moving Train and Objects Falling from Trains HN Core Hazard for flying debris from moving trains and objects falling from trains has been developed to include those situations where parts of the train and objects carried on the train are separated from the moving train and are a potential hazard to neighbours.
These incidents are covered in the Core Hazard HN unsecured objects at height. Neither the causal nor the consequence models refer to situations where parts of the train and objects carried on the train are separated from the moving train and are a potential hazard to passengers or workers.
Falling objects from the infrastructure HW , HN. System Level Security Issues The transportation network constitutes the artery of economic activity and growth in modern economies. It is not surprising therefore to find transportation on the social and political agenda and any faults, failures and consequent accident, being given a high degree of publicity and exposure.
Traditionally, the key mantra in transportation has been safety followed by reliability, punctuality, cost, journey time and quality of travel.
This has held true so far for the most modes of transport until recently when malicious intent with the aim of disrupting the network, victimising its customers and inflicting large economic losses has added a new ingredient to the traditional concerns of the industry.
This is where the power of scientific structured approaches and methodologies principally applied in safety engineering can be exploited to render assurance in transportation security in road, rail, shipping and aviation transport hubs.
The proficient assessment, control and mitigation of safety and security risks demand a systematic and objective approach to understanding and proactive management of response processes. However, the traditional focus of security relating to the physical infrastructure and systems is now extended to cyber systems in view of the extensive deployment of modern communications and computing in the railways. A systematic approach to system level security should consider physical and cyber threats and vulnerabilities to assure adequate security throughout the life cycle of the product, process, system or undertaking.
Many facets of a system s performance are inter-related and overall optimisation requires a reasonable insight into the desirable system properties and performance profile. It also generates rational criteria in support of decision making thus reducing the dependency upon opinion-based subjectivity, lengthy processes and less-informed costly choices.
Additionally, it generates major economic benefits by arriving at a right solution first time. In short, a more objective and numerate approach could help to avoid the subjectivity which be-devils much of the current approach to safety and security management. Finally, an integrated approach to safety and security assurance that is based on a generic accident model is intuitively more pertinent than one based on anecdotal observation and view of available technologies.
It rebalances focus on risks that arise during design, installation, operation, maintenance and retrofitting. It cuts across organisational boundaries, roles, responsibilities and requisite competences that, in the system life-cycle approach, tend to be overlooked thus constraining our perception of risks. In view of the increasing concerns over security of the transportation systems, the advanced processes and methodologies principally developed and applied in safety critical industries such as nuclear, transportation, oil and gas industries should be extended to the prognosis of transportation vulnerabilities to malicious intent.
In view of the generic nature of the process, these capabilities can be extended to provide the integrated services beyond transportation. The risk profiling of the national railways depicted in Section did not take security threats and system level vulnerabilities into account. This was largely driven by the concerns over network safety at the time and lack of immediate security threats to the railways.
Ever-since, railways and mass transit systems in the European mainland and indeed in Asia have been targets of attacks and terrorism highlighting the need for a consistent, comprehensive and effective approach to security assurance alongside that of safety.
Safety Roles and Competences The safety performance of the various transportation modes is on the steady improvement largely driven by better regulation, improved deployment of communications and computing technologies in spite of rising speeds and passenger numbers. The European Railway Agency ERA has published indicative statistics on the relative safety of various transportation modes that indicates railways are approaching aviation levels of safety on a normalised per billion kilometre of passenger travel basis Table.
Car occupant. Powered two-wheelers. Railway passenger. The rules, codes of practice and standards constitute the other key contributory facet of overall system safety framework. Here, we concentrate on the systematic characterisation, evaluation, assessment and management of safety competences as a key aspect of the human dimension in safety performance.
Competence The European Guide to good practice in knowledge management [ ] defines competence as an appropriate blend of knowledge, experience and motivational factors that enables a person to perform a task successfully. In this context, competence is the ability to perform a task correctly, efficiently and consistently to a high quality, under varying conditions, to the satisfaction of the end client.
So a competent person is much more than and knowledge worker [ ]. Competency may also be attributed to a group or a team when a task is performed by more than one person in view of the multi-disciplinary nature, complexity or the scale. A competent person or team requires a number of requisite qualities and capabilities, namely.
The domain knowledge empirical, scientific or a blend of both. The experience of application knowing what works in different contexts and the requisite skills.
The ability to adapt to changing circumstances and demands by creating new know-how. The ability to perform the requisite tasks efficiently and minimise wastage of physical and virtual resources.
The ability to sense what is desired and consistently delivers a high quality to the satisfaction of the end client s. In this spirit, competence is the ability to generate success, satisfaction, value and excellence from the application of knowledge and knowhow. It further states that competence indicates sufficiency of knowledge and skills that enable someone to act in a wide variety of situations.
Because each level of responsibility has its own requirements, competence can occur in any period of a person s life or at any stage of his or her career. With reference to the legal profession, the dictionary defines competence as the capacity of a person to understand a situation and to act reasonably. The disputes regarding the competence of an individual are settled by a judge and not by a professional such as a doctor or a psychiatrist although the judge may seek expert opinion before delivering at a judgment.
The HSE [ ] further maintain that competence develops over time. Individuals develop their competence through a mix of initial training, on-the-job learning, instruction, assessment and formal qualification. In the early stages of training and experience, individuals should be closely supervised.
As competence develops, the need for direct supervision should be reduced. If you are engaging a person or organisation to carry out construction work for you, then you need to make a reasonable judgement of their competence based on evidence.
The evidence will usually be supplied to you by the person or organisation quoting or bidding for the work. There are many industry card schemes which can help in judging competence. However, the possession of a card by an individual is only one indication of competence.
You are expected to make efforts to establish what qualifications and experience the cardholder has. Recent Developments The matters of competence and relevance of the deployed human resource to the requirements of mission and safety critical tasks have always been recognised but not been explicitly formalised until recently. The European Standard for Safety Critical Software [ ] in the rail sector is potentially the first to recognise and formalise human competence requirements in the context of high-integrity software development for railway applications.
The tables in Annex B of the standard have ten normative role specifications in the development of high- integrity software for safety applications, namely B. For each one of the above roles, a template based on the UML Class for the role is developed to describe the minimum essential competence requirements in terms of attributes qualities and operations key activities and responsibilities in the development and deployment of safety critical software.
In this respect, the competence requirements in the safety critical software standard are just a start and a foundation for more elaborations! In principle, many of the normative software roles are generic and can be modified and applied to hardware, sub-system and system aspects. In a complex and safety critical project, it is beneficial if not necessary to adopt a systematic approach to characterising, assessing and managing competence in the key roles since as a minimum these will be required for sub- system and system level software developers where a fair proportion of the change will originate from.
To this end, a Competence Assessment and Management System is an essential aspect of a credible strategy within the context of a safety critical programme. Competence Assessment and Management, a Systems Approach Given the six facets of competence elaborated earlier under.
Whilst a blend of all six facets is a pre-requisite for competency and mastery in a given discipline, the significance of each is highly dependent on the context and requirements of a given domain. Whilst theoretical knowledge plays a more significant role in abstract scenarios, experience of application, adaptability and creativity may become more prominent in other domains. Whatever the domain, however, a systems framework for the evaluation, development and enhancement of competence is called for.
This by necessity comprises two inter-dependent framework one focused on evaluation and assessment and the other on the management of competence. The latter aspects of benchmarking, evaluating, assessing and potentially enhancing competence are inherent in the underpinning WeFA methodology [ ] and not elaborated here.
The Schema details are omitted and elaborated in the subsequent section. The Systemic Competence Assessment Framework The determination, benchmarking, evaluation and quantified performance assessment of six drivers and three inhibitor Goals in the above WeFA schema is carried out as follows. Given the poor state of attention to competence and systematic approaches to its recognition, evaluation and assessment internationally, United Kingdom appears amongst the leading proponents globally [ ].
This principally helps determine the driver and inhibitor goals for the higher-level goal, the domain experience. The requisite psycho-physical factors and behaviours in a given context as depicted in the driver Goal G in the framework is supported by subsequent decomposition of G into lower-level WeFA structures in WeFA. This principally helps determine the driver and inhibitor goals for motivational, behavioural and drive aspects.
The key determinants of quality, excellence and consistency in carrying out tasks in a given context as depicted in the driver Goal G in the framework is supported by subsequent decomposition of G into lower-level WeFA structures, drivers and inhibitors, respectively.
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